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RELEVANT STATUTES 
1I f • ih ""(ins11 t ut i on \ i « i r 11? X I I I
 r Sect; c 
All tangible property _ 
exempt under the laws of the United States, or 
under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a 
uniform and equal rate in proportion to its 
value, to be ascertained as provided by 1 aw. 
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Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3: 
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment on all tangible 
property in the state, according to its value 
in money, . . . . The Legislature shall 
prescribe by law such provisions as shall 
secure a just valuation for taxation of such 
property, so that every person and corporation 
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of 
his, her, or its tangible property, . . . . 
Utah Code Annotated, § 59-3-1 (Supp. 1983) - See Appendix 3. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 59-5-57 - See Appendix 3. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 59-5-109 (Supp. 1981) - See Appendix 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal seeks review of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Summary Judgment and the Order, both dated February 28, 
1992, of the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court (collectively referred to herein as the 
"Judgment"), which reduced the assessed value of Kennecott's 
property, as of January 1, 1983, from $136,449,995 to an assessed 
value of $123,405,445. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
In 1983, Kennecott sought review of the January 1, 1983, 
assessment of its property by the State Assessed Property Division 
of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission"), asserting that 
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C. Statement of Relevant Facts, 
1. On May 24, 1983, the State Assessed Property Division of 
the Commission sent a Notice of Assessment to Kennecott, informing 
Kennecott that its personal and real property had been assessed as 
of January 1, 1983 • The assessed value of Kennecott's property for 
1983 was $136,685,576. R. 336, 
2. On June 1, 1983, Kennecott filed a Petition of Protest 
relative to its 1983 assessment with the Commission. This Petition 
protested the Notice of Assessment as it applied to the assessed 
real property "on the grounds that the Notice of Assessment . . . 
failed to apply a rollback to 1978 values on that real property 
assessed by the Utah State Tax Commission." R. 2. 
3. On June 29, 1983, the Commission held an informal hearing 
on Kennecott's protect. R. 20. 
4. On January 26, 1984, the Commission issued a decision 
denying Kennecott the reduction it sought, and sustaining the 
original assessment. R. 20. 
5. On March 13, 1984, the Utah Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Rio Alaom Mining Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P. 2d 184 
(Utah 1984). The named plaintiffs in the Rio Alcrom case were Rio 
Algom Corporation, Utah Power & Light, Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc., 
Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., Atlas Corporation, and Northwest 
Pipeline Corporation. 
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6. On June 4, 1984, Kennecott petitioned the Commission for 
a formal hearing on its 1983 assessment. Kennecott specifically 
claimed that it was entitled to have the value of the property 
"rolled back" from its 1983 value to 1978 levels, pursuant to 
Article XIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution or, alternatively, 
pursuant to Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3. 
7. On September 11, 1984, the Commission held a formal 
hearing on Kennecott's 1983 protest and, on June 27, 1985, issued 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision. R. 
20. In its Final Decision, the Commission found that "the roll 
back in property values for locally assessed property was done 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109 (1953, as amended). That 
statute was held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of 
Utah in the case of Rio Alaom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 
184 (Utah 1984). The Supreme Court stated in its decision that its 
determination was to be given only prospective relief and would be 
retroactive only in certain circumstances. Those circumstances 
only applied to the litigants in the Rio Alaom case. Since 
appellant [Kennecott] was not one of the six taxpayers that were 
parties to that decision, then Rio Alaom does not apply retroac-
tively. (Rio Alaom, supra)." R. 20-23. 
8. On November 26, 1985, Kennecott filed a Complaint, Notice 
of Appeal and Petition for Review of a Decision of the Utah State 
BTP13.005 5 
Tax Commission in the Tax Division of the Third Judicial District 
Court. This action appealed the Commission's June 27, 1985, 
decision and prayed for an order reducing the valuation of 
Kennecott's property by the Commission for 1983 by the sum of 
$14,444,315, and for a refund of tax paid by Kennecott under 
protest, in the amount of $898,475. R. 1-8. 
9. On January 7, 1986, the Commission moved the District 
Court for an order dismissing Kennecott,s complaint on the grounds 
that Kennecott was not entitled to relief by application of the 
ruling in Rio Algom, supra. In the alternative, and in the event 
that the District Court concluded Kennecott was entitled to relief 
under Rio Algom, the Commission moved that the case be remanded for 
further adjudication. R. 12-19. 
10. On August 18, 1986, the District Court issued a Decision 
and Order on the Commission's motion to dismiss. The District 
Court denied the motion, stating that the Commission had erroneous-
ly decided that Kennecott "was entitled to no relief under either 
Rio Alaom Corp. v. San Juan County, supra, or Article XIII, 
Sections 2 and 3, Utah Constitution." R. 220. The District Court 
did grant the Commission's motion to remand and instructed the 
Commission to give appropriate consideration to Rio Algom factors. 
11. On June 27, 1987, the Commission entered an Order styled 
"Amended Final Decision and Order", which (1) reduced the assessed 
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value of Kennecott's property for 1983, and (2) further rolled back 
the reduced value to the 1978 level by applying a factor of 1.4. 
R. 247-250. 
12. Salt Lake County (the "County") appealed the Commission's 
Amended Final Decision and Order and the District Court remanded 
for a second time, with directions indicating that the reduction of 
value was improper and directing the Commission to make express 
findings concerning whether the two-pronged test contained in Rio 
Alcrom, supra, had been met. R. 423-429. 
13. On August 15, 1990, the Commission held a formal hearing 
pursuant to the Court's second remand order and, thereafter, 
entered an "order", dated September 5, 1991, determining that the 
requirements of Rio Alaom had been met, R. 528-533. 
14. Based upon the Commission's order of September 5, 1991, 
the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Kennecott. 
R. 696-704, Appendix 1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The sole issue in this appeal concerns the application and 
interpretation of this court's decision in the Rio Alaom case, 
supra. It is the County's position that the District Court erred 
when it denied the motion of the County and the Commission to 
dismiss Kennecott's complaint. The District Court erroneously 
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interpreted the Rio Alaom decision as establishing a test for 
pending litigants, when the Utah Supreme Court clearly intended the 
relief granted in Rio Alaom to apply only to the six parties 
plaintiff in that case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
KENNECOTT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF 
GRANTED TO THE SIX PARTIES PLAINTIFF IN THE 
RIO ALSOM DECISION 
In proceedings below, the District Court erroneously found 
that Kennecott was entitled to establish the factors outlined in 
this court's Rio Alaom decision in Part V, Proceedings on Remand. 
681 P. 2d, at 197. Resolution of this appeal hinges on the 
interpretation of this court's intentions relative to the relief 
granted in the Rio Alaom case, supra. The language of the decision 
which is in dispute is set forth below: 
For the same reetsons that motivated the 
foregoing decisions, we direct that our hold-
ing of unconstitutionality be prospective and 
effective only from and after January 1, 1984. 
As to the six plaintiff-taxpayers who are 
parties to this appeal, however, this decision 
shall be retroactive for the year for which 
this suit for refund was brought. 
V. PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND 
Having concluded that § 59-5-109 is uncon-
stitutional, it is appropriate to state the 
guidelines that should be applied in determin-
ing what relief may be granted on remand. 
BTP13.005 8 
For the plaintiffs to recover an alleged 
overpayment of taxes paid under protest on the 
ground that § 59-5-109 caused a shift in the 
tax burden to their properties, plaintiffs 
must prove two elements. First, the plain-
tiffs must demonstrate that the county-as-
sessed properties were appraised at less than 
their 1981 true values. Second, the plain-
tiffs must establish by independent evidence 
the true value of their own properties, and 
the appraisal used must give due effect to the 
same economic factors as the formulae used to 
value the county-assessed properties. [Cita-
tions omitted.] 
681 P.2d, at 196-197. 
The District Court, in its August 18, 1986, Memorandum 
Decision (R. 219-221), ruled that the Utah Supreme Court did not 
intend by its ruling in the Rio Alcrom case to "deny a taxpayer 
having a pending assessment challenge on March 13, 1984, the date 
Rio Algom was decided, the opportunity of fully pursuing its 
protest and obtaining any relief to which it may be entitled 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-7-12 (1953), as 
amended." R. 220. It is the County's position, however, that that 
is precisely what the Supreme Court intended to do. 
It is important to remember that the Rio Alaom case involved 
a constitutional challenge to two statutes — § 59-5-4.5, which the 
court declined to declare unconstitutional; and § 59-5-109, which 
the court held to be unconstitutional, applying that holding 
prospectively from January 1, 1984, with the exception of the six 
parties plaintiff in the Rio Algom case, itself. In connection 
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with its discussion of § 59-5-4.5, the court established a two-
prong test that future challengers of the application of that 
statute must meet in order to prove that application of the statute 
to the challengers resulted in unequal treatment. 681 P.2d, at 
192. 
Having dealt with § 59-5-4.5, the Rio Alaom court went on to 
discuss the constitutionality of § 59-5-109 and held it to be 
unconstitutional. The court ruled that its decision would be 
prospective and effective only after January 1, 1984, except as to 
the six parties plaintiff in the Rio Alaom case, itself. The court 
then went on to outline what those six parties were required to 
establish, on remand, to obtain the relief granted to them, and to 
no others, in the Rio Alaom decision. 681 P. 2d, at 197. Thus, the 
court established a test which applied only to the six parties 
plaintiff in the Rio Alaom case. The District Court interpreted 
the decision to mean that Kennecott was entitled to meet the burden 
outlined in the Rio Alaom decision. That interpretation was 
clearly erroneous because the relief granted to Rio Alaom plain-
tiffs is available only to the Rio Alaom plaintiffs. 
In its decision to apply the Rio Alaom holding prospectively, 
this court considered and discussed a number of cases where this 
unusual relief was granted. Among those cases were the decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 411 U.S. 
BTP13.005 10 
192, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 51 (1973)1; City of Phoenix v. 
Kolodzieiski. 399 U.S. 204, 90 S.Ct. 1990, 26 L.Ed.2d 523 (1970)2; 
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed. 2d 
647 (1969)3; Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.. 458 
U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982)4. 
The Rio Alaom court also considered the decisions in Southern 
Pacific Company v. Cochise County, 92 Ariz. 395, 377 P.2d 770 
(1963). In that case, the Arizona Supreme Court found that a 
taxpayer could not be granted a refund of taxes paid under protest 
where granting the refund would threaten the financial solvency of 
the state taxing authorities. Id. , at 778. In Strickland v. 
Newton County, 244 Ga. 54, 258 S.E.2d 132 (1979), another case 
relied upon by the Rio Alaom court, the Georgia Supreme Court noted 
that when a court decides that one of its ruling shall operate only 
Holding that a statement and those with whom it deals are not to be subjected to harsh, 
retrospective relief merely because they act on the basis of presumptively valid legislation, 
in the absence of contrary judicial direction. 411 U.S., at 193, 207-209. 
Holding that it would be unjustifiably disruptive to give the decision determining election 
statute unconstitutional full retroactive effect and directing that the decision shall apply 
only to authorizations not final as of June 23, 1970. 399 U.S., at 214. 
Holding that full retroactive effect to decision that limitation of franchise was unconstitu-
tional would impose significant hardships on cities, bondholders and others connected with 
municipal utilities and directing that decision be applied only where, under state law, the 
time for challenging the election result had not expired and the elections were not final. 
395 U.S., at 706. 
Holding that the broad grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts is unconstitutional, but 
retroactive application would visit substantial injustice and hardship on those who had relied 
on the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction, the Supreme Court gave only prospective effect to its 
judgment. 458 U.S., at 88. 
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prospectively, that decision is subject to not set principles and 
the court may choose any relevant date in the interest of justice. 
258 S.E.2d, at 133-134. 
Of particular interest in this court's inclusion of Kansas 
City Millwright Co., Inc. v. Kalbr 221 Kan. 658, 562 P. 2d 65 
(1977), in its discussion concerning prospective application of 
determinations of statutory unconstitutionality. In that case, the 
court held that its decision would control the rights of all 
taxpayers who had paid taxes under protest and had pending actions 
challenging the validity of the tax on the date the decision of the 
Kansas Supreme Court was announced. Id. , at 74. It is clear, 
then, that the Utah Supreme Court, in deciding what date its Rio 
Alaom decision would become effect and to which parties it would 
apply, was wholly aware that it could make the ruling applicable to 
any party with an action pending and affirmatively chose not to do 
so. 
Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County Bd. . 657 P. 2d 257 (Utah 
1982), is also illustrative. That case was decided on October 28, 
1982. However, this court determined that the rules adopted 
should be applied prospectively, with a delayed effective date of 
January 1, 1983. Discussing its decision concerning the effective 
date of its ruling, this court noted: 
Ordinarily an overruling decision has retro-
active operation. [Citation omitted.] Retro-
BTP13.005 1 2 
active operation occurs, to some degree, 
whenever a case is applied in any manner to 
control the legal consequences flowing from 
fact situations which arose at a point earlier 
than the announcement of the new rule. The 
application may be to parties and facts of the 
case where the new rule is announced, to 
pending cases, to future-initiated cases 
arising from earlier events, or in some rare 
instances to terminated cases which are sub-
ject to collateral attack. [Citation omit-
ted.] 
Constitutional law neither requires nor 
prohibits retroactive operation of an overrul-
ing decision. A decision's operative effect 
is treated as a function of judicial policy 
rather than judicial power. [Citations omit-
ted.] In other words, the extent of the 
decision's application is left to the discre-
tion of the court. [Citations omitted.] 
Where overruled law has been justifiably 
relied upon or where retroactive operation 
creates a burden, the court, in its discre-
tion, may prohibit retroactive operation of 
the overruling decision. [Citation omitted.] 
In such instances, prospective operation of a 
court decision has long been applied. [Cita-
tion omitted.] In some cases, purely prospec-
tive application of the declared law of the 
case results in the new law not applying to 
the parties in the overruling case. [Cita-
tions omitted.] 
657 P.2d, at 264-265. 
It is abundantly clear that this court was aware that there 
might be pending challenges to the constitutionality of § 59-5-109 
at the time it rendered its decision in Rio Algom and made a 
conscious decision to apply the ruling only to the six parties 
plaintiff in that case. After balancing the comparative burdens, 
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this court determined that severe hardship which would be imposed 
on local governmental units if their decision were given retroac-
tive effect, 681 P.2d, at 196. Thus, this court limited its 
decision and held that it would control the rights of only the 
parties to the decision that overruled the constitutionality of § 
59-5-109. 
The District Court misinterpreted this court's ruling in Rio 
Alaom, when it found that Kennecott was entitled to pursue its 
appeal, the basis of which that Kennecott, as a state assessed 
entity, was unconstitutionally overassessed because it did not 
receive the benefit of the rollback granted to locally assessed 
properties under § 59-5-109 in 1983. The value of the property was 
not in dispute; that value was agreed upon by all parties. The 
single issue upon which Kennecott's challenge was based was whether 
§ 59-5-109 deprived Kennecott of equal treatment under Article 
XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution. 
This court determined that § 59-5-109 was, in fact, violative 
of Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 and ruled that, effective January 
1, 1984. 681 P.2d, at 196. Having made that ruling, this court 
went on to direct that, in proceedings on remand, the six parties 
plaintiff could recover an overpayment of taxes if they established 
(1) that county assessed properties were appraised at less than 
their true values for the tax year at issue and (2) the true value 
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of their own properties, using an appraisal that gave due effect to 
the same economic factors as the formulae used to value the county-
assessed properties. 681 P.2d, at 197. 
The lien date relative to the Kennecott appeal here is January 
1, 1983, a year prior to the effective date of this court's ruling 
in Rio Alaom. Therefore, during the time period at issue, § 59-5-
109 is presumed to be constitutional. The basis for Kennecott's 
appeal was that application of § 59-5-109 to locally assessed 
properties and not state assessed properties was unconstitutional. 
That issue was resolved against Kennecott by virtue of the 
effective date of this court's decision in Rio Alaom. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erroneously found that Kennecott was 
entitled to establish the two factors to obtain this court outlined 
in granting limited relief to the six parties plaintiff in Rio 
Alaom and remanded the case to the Commission for that purpose. 
That interpretation, however, ignores this court's specific ruling 
that the relief afforded to the six parties plaintiff in the Rio 
Alaom case shall control only the rights of those six parties. Had 
this court intended for the ruling to apply to parties with pending 
challenges to § 59-5-109, it would have been a simple matter for 
the court to include those parties in its ruling. It did not. For 
these reasons, the judgment granted by the Third Judicial District 
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Court must be reversed and Kennecott's request for refund must be 
denied. 
DATED this j$U day of August, 1992. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
KARL HENDRICKSON 
Depj i t^Sa^ t Lake County At torney 
^ ^ S f L t T tflOiffiS PETERS ' 
Special Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorneys for Salt Lake County 
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KENNECOTT CORPORATION, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Petitioner/ ) FINDINGS OF FACT 
Appellant, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. ) 
) 
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF. ) 
UTAH and SALT LAKE COUNTY, ) Civil No. CS5-SG15 
) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) Judge Kenneth Riatruo 
) 
x x x x x x x x 
Plaintiff Kennecott Corporation's, ("Kennecott") notion 
for summary judgment was heard by the court on October 28, 1991. 
Kennecott was represented at the hearing by its attorney Kent W. 
Winterholler of Parsons 3ehie & Latimer. Salt lake County was 
represented by its attorney Bill Thomas Peters. Appearing at the 
hearing in behalf of the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commis-
sion") was its attorney, Rick Carlton. At the conclusion cf the 
hearing the court directed that the Tax Commission's record of 
the hearings held in this case before the Tax Commission, upon 
which Kennecott's motion was based, be transmitted to the ccurt. 
The order directing the transmission of this Tax Commission 
record was entered by the court on October 29, 1991. Thereafter, 
tne court received the record of tne Tax Commission's hearincs in 
this appeal and review proceeding, and has reviewed tne same. 
Kenneiott and Salt Lake County both submitted memoranda if law 
respecting their positions in tnis proceeding. 
The court now having heard the arguments of counsel, 
having reviewed the respective memoranda of the parties, and sav-
ing reviewed the record of the proceedings held before the Tax 
Commission, and being fully advised in the premises, does hereby 
enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1, The total assessed value of Kennecott's property 
located in Salt Lake County, as assessed by the Property Tax 
Division of the Tax Commission as of January 1, 19S3, was 
5136,449,995. Included in that assessment was 35,924,CS4 
assigned to land and $29,731,340 assigned to buildings and 
improvements. This total Kennecott real property assessed value 
of $45,655,924 represents twenty (20) percent of the fair market 
value of Kennecott's land, buildings and improvements as deter-
mined by the Tax Commission pursuant to Utan Code Ann. § 59-5-57 
(Supp. 1983). 
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2. The total Tax Commission assessed value cf 
$45,655,924 assigned to real property did nor include any assess-
ment for Kennecott's mine and mining claims as of January 1, 
1333 . 
3. The Utah State Tax Commission used tne comparable 
sales method of valuation, or market approach to value, for ::s 
valuation of Kennecott's land included m the real property 
assessment of S45,655,924 . The Tax Commission m assessing ::e 
buildings and improvements included m Kennecott's real property 
assessment of $45,635,294 used a cost approach to value, or a 
replacement cost new less depreciation methodology, based upon 
the Marshall & Swift Cost Manual. 
4. Salt Lake County used the same valuation methodol-
ogies in assessing locally assessed commercial and industrial 
land and improvements as of January l, 1983, as was used by tne 
Tax Commission in assessing Kennecott's real property as of Janu-
ary 1, 1983. Both the comparable sales method of valuation, or 
the market approach, as well as the cost approach valuation 
method used by both the Tax Commission and Salt lake County for 
1933 are used to arrive at fair market values and botn memoes 
account for inflation or deflation as these factors may affect 
the fair market value of real property. 
5. In 1983 Salt Lake County reduced the assessed 
value of land and improvements assessed by the Salt Lake County 
-3-
Assessor by a factor of 1.4 to roll fcac/i these land and improve-
ment values to 197S levels pursuant to the provisions of Utan 
Code Ann. § 59-5-109 (Supp. 1982,. 
6. Kennecott's real property assessment as accom-
plished by the Tax Commission was not reduced by the 1.4 factor, 
or roiled back to 197S levels by the Tax Commission, in assigning 
an assessed value to Kennecott's real property of 545,655,924. 
If the Tax Commission had applied tr.e same roll cacx factor re 
Kennecott's real property as was assigned by the Salt lake County 
Assessor's office to locally assessed real property, so as to 
reduce the assessed value of Kennecott's real property, the total 
assessment of Kennecott's centrally assessed property as of Janu-
ary 1, 1983 would have been $122,405,445. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court 
hereby makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Because the Salt lake County Assessor rolled back 
the value of locally assessed real property by a factor of 1.-, 
wnich real property was assessed cy tr.e same methodology as was 
Kennecott's centrally assessed real property as of January 1, 
19S3, comparable locally assessed real property in Salt lake 
County was undervalued by a factor of 1.4 in relation to Kenne-
cott's centrally assessed property as of January 1, 1983. 
-4-
2. In order to equalize tne valuation of 7ennecctt's 
centrally assessed properry with the assessed valie of comparable 
locally assessed property, KennecGtt's real property snculd nave 
its assessed value rolled back by a factor of 1.4. This results 
in an assessed value for Kennecctt's centrally assessed property 
located in Salt Lake County as of January 1, 198: cf 
3123,405,445. 
3. The records of the Utan State Tax Commission arc 
of the Salt Lake County Treasurer, Auditor and Assessor shall oe 
corrected so as to reflect that the total assessed value cf Ken-
necott's centrally assessed property located in Salt Lake Ccunty 
as of January 1, 1983 shall be 5123,405,445. 
4. The September 5, 1991 and October 25, 1991 orders 
of the Tax Commission are amply supported by the evidence 
contained in the Tax Commission's record of these proceedings. 
The court's de novo, independent review of the record satisfies 
the court that Xennecott has demonstrated to the court and the 
Tax Commission, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Zax 
Commission's orders of September 5, 1991 and October 25, 1991 
should be, and hereby are, affirmed in their entirety. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Judgment is hereby awarded m favor of Kennecott reduc-
ing the assessed value of Kennecott's centrally assessed property 
located m Salt Lake County as of January l, 1983 from tne 
-5-
assessed value originally assigned by the Utah State Tax Comm. 
sion of $136,449,995, to the Tax Commission assessed value 
reflected and stated in the Utah State Tax Commission's Order 
September 5, 1991 of 5122,405,445. 
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59-2-24 Revenue a 
provided livestock sold for slaughter or being held 
for slaughter shall be assessed at 14% of the fair 
cash value of the fraction of the full number of 
animals which the length of time said animals were 
held bears to the full year, but in no case for less 
than one-sixth of the full number of animals. 
(3) On January 1, 1972, said property shall be 
assessed at 8Vo of its reasonable fair cash value; 
provided livestock sold for slaughter or being held 
for slaughter shall be assessed at 8°7o of the fair 
cash value of the fraction of the full number of 
animals which the length of time said animals were 
held bears to the full year, but in no case for less 
than one-sixth of the full number of animals. 
(4) On January 1, 1973, and thereafter, said 
property shall be wholly exempted from ad valorem 
taxes. i9» 
Effective tkrMffc December 31,19SS 
59-2-24. (Effective January 1, 1986). Inventory held 
for sale in ordinary course of business - Rate of 
assessment to reduce. 
Those wares and merchandise held for sale in the 
ordinary course of business and which constitute the 
inventory of any retailer, wholesaler, manufacturer, 
fanner, or livestock owner, and which are present 
in the state of Utah on January 1, shall be exempt 
from ad valorem property taxes. ins 
59-2-25. Inventory held for sale in ordinary coarse 
of business • Inventory defined. 
As used in sections 59-2-23 through 59-2-30, 
"inventory/ except livestock and poultry inventory, 
means all items of tangible personal property 
described as materials, containers, goods in process, 
finished goods and other personal property owned 
by or in possession of the retailer, wholesaler, or 
manufacturer, that are or will become, part of the 
stock in trade of the retailer, wholesaler or manuf-
acturer, held for sale in the ordinary course of his 
business. Livestock and poultry inventory is defined 
as all livestock and poultry sold in the ordinary 
course of business during the taxable year. 19*9 
59-2-26. Inventory held for sale in ordinary coarse 
of business - Property to which act shall not apply. 
The exemption granted by this act shall not apply 
to goods, wares, and merchandise not heretofore 
subject to ad valorem personal property taxation 
and shall not apply to property or mineral deposits 
covered by the provisions of section 59-5-56 
through 59-5-85. 19*9 
59-2-27. Inventory held for sale in ordinary course 
of business • Rules, regulations and forms. 
The state tax commission shall prescribe rules, 
regulations and forms under which the foregoing 
may be applied. i%9 
59-2-29. Inventory held for sale in ordinary course 
of business - Borden of proof to establish exempti-
o n . 
The burden of proof shall be upon the taxpayer 
to establish any exemption. i%* 
59-2-29. Inventory held for sale in ordinary coarse 
of business - Effective date for application of act. 
The provisions of this act shall apply to said 
goods, wares, merchandise, livestock and poultry on 
hand and present in this state on and after January 
1,1970. i%9 
59-2*30. Property used for religious worship or 
/.w.rii.Ku nnnuMM • Reanimnents for exemption. 
UTAH CODE 
1985-1986 
exemptions for property used exclusively for either 
religious worship or charitable purposes provided 
for in section 2 of Article XIII o f the Constitution 
of the state of Utah. This section is not intended to 
expand or limit the scope of such exemptions. Any 
property whose use is dedicated to religious worship 
or charitable purposes including property which is 
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the acco-
mplishment o f such religious worship or charitable 
purposes, intended to benefit an indefinite number 
of persons is exempt from taxation if all o f the 
following requirements are met: 
(1) The user is not organized to produce a profit 
from the use of the property. 
(2) N o part of any net earnings, from the use of 
the property, inures to the benefit o f any private 
shareholder or individual, but any net earnings shall 
be used directly or indirectly, for the charitable or 
religious purposes of the organization. 
(3) The property is not used or operated by the 
organization or other person so as to benefit any 
officer, trustee, director, shareholder, lessor, 
member, employee, contributor, or any other 
person through the distribution o f profits, payment 
of excessive charges or compensations. 
(4) Upon the liquidation, dissolution, or abando-
nment of the user no part o f any proceeds derived 
from such use will inure to the benefit o f any 
private person. 1973 
59*2-31. Applicability of constitutional provision 
for exemption of property used for charitable 
purposes. 
(1) Property used exclusively for religious, 
hospital, educational, employee representation, or 
welfare purposes which use complies with the requ-
irements of section 59-2-30, shall be deemed to be 
used for charitable purposes within the exemption 
provided for in section 2 of Article XIII of the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, and section 59-2-
30. 
(2) This section shall not defeat exemptions for 
property not specifically enumerated which may be 
found to be within the exemption provided in 
section 2 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the 
state of Utah. 1973 
59-2-32. Livestock exemption. 
For purposes of this section "livestock* means all 
domestic animals, poultry, fur-bearing animals and 
fish kept for breeding or other useful purposes. 
Livestock in Utah is exempt from taxation 
according to its value in money. iw 
Chapter 3. Definitions 
59-3-1. Definitions. 
As used in this title: 
(1) "Property* means property which is subject to 
assessment and taxation according to its value, and 
does not include moneys, credits, bonds , stocks, 
representative property, franchises, good will, copy-
rights, patents, or other things commonly known as 
intangibles. 
(2) "Real estate* includes 
(a) The possession of, claim to , ownership of 
or right to the possession of, land. 
(b) All mines, minerals, and quarries in and 
under the land, all timber belonging to individuals 
or corporations growing or being on the lands of 
this state or the United States, and all rights and 
orivilefies aDDertaining thereto. 
id Taxation 
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county, the total assessment of all such property, 
and the amount of the apportionment of such total 
assessments to each county. The record assessment 
books and the information upon which the assess-
ments and apportionments are calculated shall be 
available for review by a county assessor, upon 
request. Each agent, employee, or other person 
acting under the control of a county assessor is 
subject to the standards and requirements of confi-
dentiality in effect for the state tax commission and 
may not release any confidential proprietary infor-
mation about a taxpayer if such person knows, or 
has reason to believe, that release of the informat-
ion would significantly competitively disadvantage 
the taxpayer. Any person who violates the confide-
ntiality requirements of this section may be impris-
oned for a period not to exceed six months, fined in 
an amount not to exceed $500, or both. In addition, 
such person shall be dismissed from county office 
or employment, as the ca.se may be, and is disqual-
ified from holding county office or employment for 
a period of five years. i«3 
59-5-55. Record assessment of utility companies -
Review by county assessor - Confidentiality -
Penalties for disclosure. 
The state tax commission must prepare each year 
a book to be called 'Record Assessment of Utility 
Companies,* in which must be entered the names of 
every person, organization or corporation engaged 
in any utility business, the value of all the tangible 
and intangible properties of said persons or 
companies doing business within the state of Utah 
upon which they are entitled to earn a fair return; 
together with such other information as the state 
tax commission may determine. 
The value of the tangible properties of the public 
utilities within the state of Utah which are to be 
recorded in the book to be called "Record Assess-
ment of Public Utilities/ shall be determined as 
follows: The commission shall each year copy in 
said book from the last volume of the book known 
as "Record of Valuation of Utility Companies," 
prepared by the public service commission, the val-
uations of the tangible properties of every public 
utility doing business in this state which said prope-
rties are located within the boundaries of Utah. 
Said valuation so recorded in the record of valuati-, 
ons of utility companies and copied by the commis-
sion in the book known as "Record of Assessments 
of Utility Companies," shall be accepted as the true 
and actual value of the tangible properties of said 
utilities in Utah, and the commission shall assess the 
properties of each public utility from the valuation 
so recorded in the same proportion to the recorded 
valuation as the assessed valuation of other tangible 
properties similarly assessed bear to their actual 
value. The record assessment books and the infor-
mation upon which the assessments and apportion-
ments are calculated shall be available for review by 
a county assessor, upon request. Each agent, 
employee, or other person acting under the control 
of a county assessor is subject to the standards and 
requirements of confidentiality in effect for the state 
tax commission and may not release any confident-
ial proprietary information about a taxpayer if such 
person knows, or has teason to believe, that release 
of the information would significantly competitively 
disadvantage the taxpayer. Any person who violates 
the confidentiality requirements of this section may 
be imprisoned for a period not to exceed six 
months, fined in an amount not to exceed $500, or 
both. In addition, such person shall be dismissed 
from county office or employment, as the case may 
be, and is disqualified from holding county office 
or employment for a period of five years. The 
commission shall consider the record of valuations 
of utility companies prepared by the public service 
commission in determining utility rates in valuing 
the property for tax purposes. i«3 
59-5-56. Occupation tax and assessment book of 
mines - Review by county assessor - Confidentiality 
• Penalties for disclosure. 
The state tax commission must prepare each year 
a book called the "Occupation Tax and Assessment 
Book of Mines," in which must be entered all occ-
upation taxes fixed and the assessment of all mines 
in the state subject to assessment by it and in which 
book must be specified in separate columns and 
under appropriate heads: 
(1) Owner of mine. 
(2) Name and description and location of the 
mine. 
(3) County in which it is situated. 
(4) Net proceeds in dollars, if a metalliferous 
mine. 
(5) Number of tons of ore mined whether by the 
owner, lessee, contractor or otherwise. 
(6) Amount received for ore and metal if sold; if 
not sold the value thereof. 
(7) Value of mine. 
(8) Value of the machinery. 
(9) Value of supplies and other personal property. 
(10) Value of improvements. 
(11) Value of machinery, property and surface 
improvements having a value separate and indepen-
dent of all such mines or mining claims assessed by 
the state tax commission, and the names of the 
owners of the same. 
Together with such other information as the tax 
commission may determine. The record assessment 
books and the information upon which the assess-
ments and apportionments are calculated shall be 
available for review by a county assessor, upon 
request. Each agent, employee, or other person 
acting under the control of a county assessor is 
subject to the standards and requirements of confi-
dentiality in effect for the state tax commission and 
may not release any confidential proprietary infor-
mation about a taxpayer if such person knows, or 
has reason to believe, that release of the informat-
ion would significantly competitively disadvantage 
the taxpayer. Any person who violates the confide-
ntiality requirements of this section may be impris-
oned for a period not to exceed six months, fined in 
an amount not to exceed $500, or both. In addition, 
such person shall be dismissed from county office 
or employment, as the case may be, and is disqual-
ified from holding county office or employment for 
a period of five years. 19S3 
59-5-57. Assessment of mines. 
All metalliferous mines and mining claims, both 
placer and rock in place, shall be assessed at $10 
per acre and in addition thereto at a value equal to 
two times the average net annual proceeds thereof 
for the three calendar years next preceding or for as 
many years next preceding as the mine has been 
operating, whichever is less; but there shall be no 
valuation based upon net annual proceeds for the 
purpose of assessment of any such mine or mining 
claim for any one year in which there were no gross 
proceeds realized in the year next preceding the year 
of assessment. All other mines or mining claims and 
iW.Eu2? IFor ANNOTATIONS, coasolt the latest UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS. 1 7 7 
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other valuable mineral deposits, including lands 
containing coal or hydrocarbons, shall be assessed 
at 20% of their reasonable fair cash value. All 
machinery used in mining and all property or 
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines 
or mining claims and the value of any surface use 
made of mining cfaims or mining property for other 
than mining purposes shall be assessed at 20% of 
their reasonable fair cash value. In all cases where 
the surface of lands is owned by one person and the 
mineral underlying such lands is owned by another, 
such property rights shall be separately assessed to 
the respective owners. In such cases the value of the 
surface if it is used for other than mining purposes 
shall be assessed by the assessor of the county in 
w hich the property is situated. m i 
Effective through December 31,19SS 
59-5-57. (Effective January 1, 1986). Assessment of 
mines. 
All metalliferous mines and mining claims, both 
placer and rock in place, shall be assessed at $50 
per acre and in addition thereto at a value equal to 
ten times the average net annual proceeds thereof 
for the three calendar years next preceding or for as 
many years next preceding as the mine has been 
operating, whichever is less; but there shall be no 
valuation based upon net annual proceeds for the 
purpose of assessment of any such mine or mining 
claim for any one year in which there were no gross 
proceeds realized in the year next preceding the year 
of assessment. All other mines or mining claims and 
other valuable mineral deposits, including lands 
containing coal or hydrocarbons, shall be assessed 
at 100% of their reasonable fair cash value. All 
machinery used in mining and all property or 
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines 
or mining claims and the value of any surface use 
made of mining claims or mining property for other 
than mining purposes shall be assessed at 100% of 
their reasonable fair cash value. In all cases where 
the surface of lands is owned by one person and the 
mineral underlying such lands is owned by another, 
such property rights shall be separately assessed to 
the respective owners. In such cases the value of the 
surface if it is used for other than mining purposes 
shall be assessed by the assessor of the county in 
which the property is situated. 19S5 
59-5-58. "Net annual proceeds" defined - Deducti-
ons - Costs and depreciation. 
The words, "net annual proceeds," of a metallif-
erous mine or mining claim are defined to be the 
gross proceeds realized during the preceding 
calendar year from the sale or conversion into 
money or its equivalent of all ores from such mine 
or mining claim extracted by the owner or lessee, 
contractor or other person working upon or 
operating the property, including all dumps and 
tailings, during or previous to the year for which 
the assessment is made; provided, that in cases 
where the ores are sold under a contract existing 
between a parent and a subsidiary company or 
between companies which are wholly or partially 
owned by a common parent or between companies 
otherwise affiliated and the gross proceeds realized 
from the ore is disproportionate to its reasonable 
fair cash value, the tax commission shall place a 
value on the ore which is equal to its reasonable fair 
cash value, and said amount shall be taken as the 
basis for the tax. The following, and no other, de-
ductions may be taken: 
(1) The amount of money actually expended 
during the year for labor, tools, appliances and 
supplies used in the mining operations, including the 
labor of the lessee and his employees and the 
amount expended by the lessee for tools, appliances, 
and supplies used by him in his mining operation; 
provided, the personal labor of lessees shall be 
computed at the prevailing wage. 
(2) The actual and necessary office, engineering, 
and clerical expenses and the salaries of employees, 
other than corporate officers within the state. 
(3) An amount for depreciation of machinery, 
buildings, structures, and other improvements and 
of the installation, construction, maintenance and 
repair of same made during the year in and about 
the workings of the mine for use in extracting the 
ores. The method of determining the amount for 
depreciation shall be the same as used in determin-
ing tax liabilities under the Internal Revenue Code. 
No depreciation shall be allowed where actual costs 
have been deducted in prior taxable years. However, 
previous to the amendment of this subsection a 
taxpayer was allowed to deduct actual costs 
expended during the year and was allowed up to a 
three-year carry forward if such costs resulted in 
negative net proceeds for the year. For taxable years 
1982 and 1983, the taxpayer may deduct actual 
costs and for taxable years 1983, 1984, 1985, and 
1986, a taxpayer may elect to exhaust its three-year 
carry forward of actual costs derived negative net 
proceeds before adopting the depreciation method; 
provided, however, that all taxpayers shall use the 
depreciation method for all taxable years after 1986. 
All actual costs expended in 1984 and years therea-
fter shall be subject to the depreciation methods 
even if the taxpayer elects to exhaust its carry 
forward in years 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. Once 
the taxpayer commences using the depreciation 
method it may depreciate all actual costs not previ-
ously deducted. 
(4) An amount for depreciation of reduction 
works and mills, and improvements thereof, constr-
ucted during the year and operated in connection 
with the mine. The method of determining the 
amount for depreciation shall be the same as used 
in determining tax liabilities under the Internal 
Revenue Code. No depreciation shall be allowed 
where actual costs have been deducted in prior 
taxable years. However, previous to the amendment 
of this subsection a taxpayer was allowed to deduct 
actual costs expended during the year and was 
allowed up to a three-year carry forward if such 
costs resulted in negative net proceeds for the year. 
For taxable years 1982 and 1983, the taxpayer may 
deduct actual costs and for taxable years 1983, 
1984, 1985, and 1986, a taxpayer may elect to 
exhaust its three-year carry forward of actual costs 
derived negative net proceeds before adopting the 
depreciation method; provided, however, that all 
taxpayers shall use the depreciation method for all 
taxable years after 1986. All actual costs expended 
in 1984 and years thereafter shall be subject to the 
depreciation methods even if the taxpayer elects to 
exhaust its carry forward in years 1983, 1984, 1985, 
and 1986. Once the taxpayer commences using the 
depreciation method it may depreciate all actual 
costs not previously deducted. 
(5) The actual cost not exceeding a reasonable 
cost of the transportation of the ore from the mine 
to the market or reduction works. 
(6) The charge made for sampling, assaying, 
reducing and smelting the ore and extracting the 
metals and minerals therefrom, provided, where a 
U.CA., Section 59-5-109 (Supp. 1981): 
All locally-assessed taxable real property 
shall be appraised at current fair market 
value and the value of such property rolled 
back to its January 1, 1978, level as such 
level is determined by the state tax 
commission. 
